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MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
FEBRUARY 28, 2012 
 
 
BARNETTE, FRANKFURTER, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
JEFFREY S. SUTTON* 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,1 as every first-year law 
student learns, is the flag-salute case.  It is a tale of two cases, not one.  
For the story must take account of the Supreme Court’s astonishing 
about-face: The Court rejected a challenge to compelled flag salutes in 
1940, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,2 before embracing the 
identical claim in Barnette, only three years later. 
But first this is a story about people, about two American families, 
the Gobitas and Barnett families.  When people lend their names to 
landmark cases, the credit is fleeting, save for the lingering acclaim that 
goes with attaching the family name to the constitutional principle for 
which the case stands.3  Not only did time soon forget the sufferings of 
the Gobitas and Barnett families, but the Court added the indignity of 
misspelling their names, forever linking the principle against compelled 
speech to families (or at least names) that do not exist.4  Although it 
 
 * Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  This article is an edited version of 
Marquette University Law School’s 2012 Hallows Lecture.  The lecture annually remembers 
E. Harold Hallows, who served on the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1958 to 1974 (and as 
chief justice during the last six of those years) and who for almost three previous decades was 
a lawyer in Milwaukee and a professor of law at Marquette University. 
1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
2. 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940). 
3. Cf. Peter D. Baird, Legal Lore: Miranda Memories, LITIGATION, Winter 1990, at 43, 
46 (discussing Ernesto Miranda’s difficulties after the landmark case bearing his name and his 
eventual death in obscurity). 
4. See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 19 (2000); see also Richard 
Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending Logic and 
Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REV. 675, 678–79 (1984) (reflecting 
on the spelling mistake). 
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would be difficult to conclude that both cases were wrongly decided, I 
must start by acknowledging that both were wrongly captioned.5  
As for the two families, let’s begin with the Gobitas clan—spelled 
with an a, not with two i’s.  Walter Gobitas held a common job and 
practiced an uncommon religion.  He owned a local grocery store in a 
Pennsylvania town known as Minersville, a community indeed filled 
with its share of miners, and raised six children with his wife, Ruth.6 
The Minersville school board required all teachers and children to 
pledge allegiance to the American flag at the beginning of each school 
day.7  The pledge was not a new idea.  It started in 1892 as a patriotic 
way to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of 
America.8  Congress declared the day a national holiday (hence 
Columbus Day) and eventually codified the pledge, with these familiar 
words: “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America 
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.”9  Congress would not add the words “under 
God” until 1954.10 
The pledge, as initially conceived, was both verbal and physical.  As 
the students recited the words, the exercise required them to extend 
their right hand from their heart outward and up toward the flag.11 
By the 1930s, this ceremony posed a problem for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, an evangelical Christian faith started in Pennsylvania in the 
1800s.12  In 1935, the leader of the Witnesses, Joseph Rutherford, gave a 
speech at the Witnesses’ national convention, encouraging Witnesses 
not to participate in flag-salute ceremonies.13  As he saw it, the Bible is 
“the Word of God” and “is the supreme authority.”14  Pledging fealty to 
anything but God—whether the object be a country, a leader, or a 
secular symbol—violated the Commandments.15 
 
5. See PETERS, supra note 4, at 19. 
6. Id. at 19–20. 
7. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591. 
8. RICHARD J. ELLIS, TO THE FLAG: THE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF 
ALLEGIANCE 19 (2005). 
9. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380. 
10. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249. 
11. § 7, 56 Stat. at 380; see also PETERS, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing this “military-
style salute” given during the pledge). 
12. PETERS, supra note 4, at 28–29. 
13. Id. at 25. 
14. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591(1940).  
15. PETERS, supra note 4, at 25–26. 
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Consistent with Rutherford’s teachings, the Gobitas children chose 
not to participate in the flag-salute ceremony required by the 
Minersville school board.16  The school board reacted by expelling 
Lillian Gobitas (age twelve) and her brother, William (ten).17  The father 
sued the school board, its members, and the superintendent in federal 
district court.18  The district court19 and the Third Circuit20 granted the 
Gobitas family relief, invoking the free-exercise guarantee of the First 
Amendment (together with the Fourteenth), and permitted the children 
to return to school.   
The Supreme Court was another matter.  All nine Justices initially 
voted to reject the claim after oral argument, with just Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Felix Frankfurter explaining their 
thinking in any detail at the Justices’ conference.21  Frankfurter 
circulated an opinion for the Court; just three days before its release, 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone circulated a dissent.22  No one else joined the 
Stone dissent.  By an 8–1 vote, the Court thus upheld compelled flag 
salutes. 
The Gobitis decision caused problems for the Gobitas family—and 
worse problems for other Jehovah’s Witnesses across the country.  As 
Shawn Francis Peters details in his excellent book, Judging Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, many Minersville residents led a boycott of the Gobitas 
grocery store.23  Thanks to the willingness of the state police to stand 
guard, no violence or destruction of the store resulted.24  After several 
months, business for the most part returned to normal.25 
The same was not true for Jehovah’s Witnesses in other 
communities.  As school boards across the country enacted mandatory 
flag-salute requirements,26 Witnesses were put to the choice of sending 
their children to the local public schools and compromising their 
religious beliefs, or sending them to private schools. 
 
16. Id. 
17. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591. 
18. PETERS, supra note 4, at 37–39. 
19. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
20. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939). 
21. PETERS, supra note 4, at 51–52.  
22. Id. at 52, 65, 237. 
23. Id. at 70–71. 
24. Id. at 70. 
25. Id. at 71. 
26. See id. at 164–65. 
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Making matters more difficult for Witnesses was the first peacetime 
draft in American history, launched in September 1940 and ramped up 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.27  Male Witnesses 
sought exemptions from conscription on the ground that proselytizing 
was a central tenet of the faith and a full-time job, leaving no time for 
war efforts.28  While the draft exempted conscientious objectors, it 
exempted them only from combat, not from other war-related services, 
which Witnesses claimed to have no time to perform.29  The Witnesses’ 
response to conscription did not sit well with draft boards across the 
country.  Over the course of World War II, the government imprisoned 
10,000 men who resisted conscription.30  Forty percent of them were 
Witnesses.31 
The Witnesses’ resistance to the flag salute and to the wartime draft, 
combined with the Supreme Court’s stamp of constitutionality on 
compelled flag salutes in Gobitis, unleashed a wave of persecution with 
few rivals in American history.  Gobitis was decided on June 3, 1940.  In 
the first three weeks after the decision, there were hundreds of attacks 
against Witnesses across the country.32  Between May and October 1940, 
the American Civil Liberties Union reported to the Justice Department, 
vigilantes attacked 1,488 Witnesses in 335 communities, covering all but 
four states in the country.33 
Local law enforcement often did little to deter the attacks.34  When a 
reporter asked one sheriff why, he answered, “They’re traitors—the 
Supreme Court says so.  Ain’t you heard?”35 
From the outset, Gobitis was not a popular decision in the press or 
the legal academy.  Some 170 newspapers editorialized against it, and 
few favored it.36  The New Republic and the ACLU criticized the 
decision fiercely—a noteworthy development because Frankfurter, the 
author of Gobitis, had helped to found both organizations.37  How, they 
thought, could one of their own, one of the great civil libertarians of the 
 
27. See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885. 
28. See PETERS, supra note 4, at 260–61. 
29. See id. 
30. Id. at 262. 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 72–95 (discussing a series of these attacks against the Witnesses). 
33. Id. at 85 (and sources cited). 
34. Id. at 73. 
35. Id. at 84. 
36. Id. at 67.  
37. Id. at 69. 
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day, the defender of Sacco and Vanzetti, write such a decision? 
The ACLU’s director at the time, Roger Baldwin, wrote a letter to 
Joseph Rutherford, the Witnesses’ leader, promising to help limit or 
overrule the decision, noting his “shock” that the Court had swept 
“aside the traditional right of religious conscience in favor of a 
compulsory conformity to a patriotic ritual.”38  “The language” of the 
decision, he added, “reflects something of the intolerant temper of the 
moment.”39 
The New Republic was tougher.  It observed that the “country is now 
in the grip of war hysteria,” creating the risk “of adopting Hitler’s 
philosophy in the effort to oppose Hitler’s legions.”40  As Peters 
recounts, the magazine even compared the decision to one by a German 
court punishing Witnesses who refused to honor the Nazi salute, saying 
it was “sure that the majority members of our Court who concurred in 
the Frankfurter decision would be embarrassed to know that their 
attitude was in substance the same as that of the German tribunal.”41  
Ouch. 
School children in Connecticut say the Pledge of Allegiance in 1942.  Library of 
Congress. 
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That brings us to the second family, the Barnett family—whose 
name ends with a t, not with an e.42  Inspired by the Gobitis decision and 
perhaps by the bombing of Pearl Harbor one month earlier, the West 
Virginia Board of Education in January 1942 required all teachers and 
students in all West Virginia schools to participate in flag-salute 
ceremonies.43  “[R]efusal to salute the Flag,” the state board said, would 
“be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with 
accordingly.”44  The “accordingly” was expulsion, with readmission 
permitted only after the student agreed to salute the flag.45  In the 
interim, the student would be treated as “unlawfully absent” and as a 
delinquent, permitting the state to prosecute the parents for truancy and 
to send the children to reformatories for juvenile delinquents.46  The 
only way out of this bind was for the affected families to send their 
children to private schools, a remedy that most could not afford.47 
Marie and Gathie Barnett, age nine and eleven, attended Slip Hill 
Grade School, an elementary school outside Charleston, West Virginia.48  
The school was neither big nor wealthy.  Until the war, indeed, it put up 
only a picture of a flag, not the real thing.49  In the spring of 1942, the 
principal of the school stopped Marie and Gathie and asked whether 
they would recite the pledge and salute the flag that day.50  In saying 
“no,” they explained that “pledging allegiance to a flag was an act of 
worship, and we could not worship anyone or anything but our God 
Jehovah.”51  The principal sent them home.52 
 
42. See Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 792 (2007).  
43. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).  
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 629. 
46. Id. at 629–30.  The Barnett children would avoid truancy charges by presenting 
themselves at school each morning, only to have the principal send them home.  Peterson et 
al., supra note 42, at 771. 
47. See Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (calculating 
the cost of tuition for 1935–1938 for the two Gobitas children as totaling in excess of $1,400).  
The private school—Jones Kingdom School—that the Gobitas children began attending was 
an old farmhouse, renovated by a sympathetic individual and serving forty students in grades 
one through eight.  PETERS, supra note 4, at 43.  Walter Gobitas modified a delivery truck 
into a bus so that the children could all ride together for the daily one-hour commute.  Id. at 
44–45. 
48. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 768. 
49. See DAN SELIGMAN, FROM GOBITIS TO BARNETTE: A PRIMER 2 (2006); Peterson 
et al., supra note 42, at 768. 
50. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 770. 
51. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 1. 
52. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 769. 
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Led by Hayden Covington, the same lawyer who had worked on the 
Gobitis case, the Barnetts sought an injunction in federal court against 
enforcement of the law.  Notwithstanding the 8–1 Gobitis decision, a 
three-judge court unanimously granted the injunction in favor of the 
parents.53  And notwithstanding the Gobitis decision, the West Virginia 
Board of Education did not ask for a stay pending its appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.54  Marie and Gathie Barnett returned to school.55 
Later that school year, the Supreme Court returned to its senses.  On 
June 14, 1943—Flag Day, as it happened—the Court held that 
compelled flag salutes could not be reconciled with the free-speech 
requirements of the First Amendment.56 
The 6–3 majority opinion was authored by one of the Court’s new 
appointees, Robert H. Jackson.  Jackson was the last individual 
appointed to the Supreme Court who did not graduate from law 
school.57  He attended Albany Law School for a year and never attended 
college.58  In spite of all this (or, horror of horrors, perhaps because of 
it), his Barnette opinion is a gem.  It explains how compelled speech 
cannot be reconciled with “free” speech.59  And it contains one of the 
most memorable lines in American constitutional history: “If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”60 
Justice Frankfurter was not happy.  Instead of making a tactical 
retreat, he doubled down on his position in Gobitis.  His method was a 
form of confession and avoidance.  He confessed to agreeing with the 
underlying policy of the Court’s opinion—that it is not the government’s 
job to coerce faith in the country.  But he avoided the conclusion that 
might flow from that premise by reminding the majority of the 
progressive critique of conservative jurists over the preceding thirty-plus 
years—that the Justices had no business importing their preferred 
policies into the Constitution.  The first five sentences of his opinion 
 
53. Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 255 (S.D. W. Va. 1942). 
54. PETERS, supra note 4, at 247. 
55. Id. at 248. 
56. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624, 642 (1943). 
57. NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 46 (2010). 
58. Id. at 42–43. 
59. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
60. Id. 
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capture the point, invoking the familiarity of members of his own faith 
(Judaism) with religious persecution: 
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted 
minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms 
guaranteed by our Constitution.  Were my purely personal 
attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with 
the general libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing 
as they do the thought and action of a lifetime.  But as judges we 
are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic.  We 
owe equal attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound 
by our judicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship 
from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these shores.  As a 
member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private 
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I 
may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their 
disregard.61 
 So ends the Barnette story, which prompts seven loosely connected 
observations. 
First, lost in every discussion of Barnette and Gobitis is a reality that 
only a lower-court judge would catch.  In all three cases, the lower 
courts were ultimately vindicated, whether it was the (initially reversed) 
district court and the court of appeals in Gobitis or the (affirmed) three-
judge court in Barnette.  The Constitution requires one Supreme Court 
and permits Congress in its discretion to create “inferior” federal courts, 
as the Constitution painfully puts it.62  One lesson from the Barnette 
story, I should like to think, is that “inferior” courts are not necessarily 
populated by inferior judges. 
Second, the Jehovah’s Witnesses played a remarkable role in 
developing First Amendment law—in Barnette and elsewhere.  The 
primary lawyer for the Witnesses, Hayden Covington, who worked on 
the Gobitis brief and argued Barnette, led an effort resulting in some 
twenty-three Supreme Court cases between 1938 and 1946 on behalf of 
Witnesses.63  The Witnesses’ objection to the flag salute, their zeal in 
spreading their faith, their willingness to proceed in the most hostile 
environments, and their omnipresent distribution of pamphlets laid the 
groundwork for much of what we now take for granted as first premises 
of First Amendment law.  Consider these other landmark Witness 
 
61. Id. at 646–47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
63. See PETERS, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
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decisions from the Supreme Court: 
 Lovell v. City of Griffin,64 a 1938 decision invalidating, as a 
violation of the free-speech and free-press guarantees of the 
First Amendment, a city ordinance that banned the distribution 
of printed literature without a permit; 
 Cantwell v. Connecticut,65 a 1940 decision incorporating the 
free-exercise clause against the states and invalidating a state 
requirement that individuals obtain a permit before soliciting 
religious contributions; 
 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,66 a 1942 decision 
establishing the fighting-words doctrine in affirming the 
conviction of a Witness who called a city marshal “a damned 
Fascist”; 
 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,67 a 1943 decision invalidating a 
municipal ordinance that required a permit (at a cost of seven 
dollars per week) to distribute or sell literature door-to-door; 
and 
 Prince v. Massachusetts,68 a 1944 decision upholding, against 
a free-exercise challenge, a state law that prohibited children 
from selling pamphlets door-to-door. 
In this era, it would have been difficult to be a Witness and not be a 
First Amendment scholar.  Without the Jehovah’s Witnesses, it is likely 
that First Amendment law would not be the same, and it is a certainty 
that it would have taken a different path. 
Third, the speed with which the Court changed its mind between 
Gobitis and Barnette is startling and unprecedented.  What is most 
striking about Barnette, and to my knowledge without counterpart in 
American constitutional history, is the shift in the number of votes in 
just three years.  What starts as an 8–1 ruling against the First 
Amendment claim becomes a 6–3 ruling in favor of it.  That is a shift of 
five votes in just three years, almost two lost votes per year. 
From the vantage point of 2012, it is easy to second-guess the Gobitis 
majority—indeed, to wonder what it was thinking.  How could the Court 
conclude that, in the midst of an epic struggle against fascism, it was a 
 
64. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
65. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
66. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
67. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
68. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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good idea to expel from school twelve-year-old (and younger) children, 
whose only offense was to stand respectfully and silently as the pledge 
was recited?  The only thing more head-snapping would be a law 
compelling salutes to the First Amendment before civics class. 
A few initial explanations are in order.  At the time, any First 
Amendment claim against a state was a relative novelty, as the free-
speech clause had been incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment only in 1925—and the free-exercise clause had 
been incorporated just fourteen days before Gobitis.69  At the time, 
Justice Frankfurter also was perceived as a leading, if not the leading, 
progressive thinker on constitutional law, and his vote in Gobitis was 
consistent with his years of advocacy against using the Constitution as a 
means of trumping the winners of the policy debates of the day.70  So, in 
1940, with Chief Justice Hughes, the Court’s leading conservative, and 
Justice Frankfurter, the leading liberal, aligned against the claim, the 
Gobitas family faced a long and steep climb. 
The war also may explain things.  Remember that Gobitis was 
handed down just months after the fall of France in World War II, 
perhaps unduly sensitizing the Court to the patriotism that likely would 
be called upon soon to sustain America’s entry into the war.71  Indeed, 
within the Court, Frankfurter’s opinion was called the “Fall-of-France” 
opinion.72  In a letter to Justice Stone on May 27, 1940, Frankfurter 
indicated that the war had affected his position and suggested that it 
should affect Stone’s.73  Wartime circumstances, Frankfurter wrote, 
required the Court to make the delicate “adjustment between 
legislatively allowable pursuit of national security and the right to stand 
on individual idiosyncra[s]ies.”74 
Oddly enough, just as the war may explain the thinking of the 
Gobitis majority, it may do the same for the Barnette majority.  How, 
Jackson thought, could the country use the fight against fascism as a 
basis for compelling unwilling children to pledge allegiance to the flag?75 
It is sometimes said that the law sleeps during war.  Perhaps the law 
 
69. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940). 
70. PETERS, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
71. See id. at 53–54.  See generally Richard Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in 
Felix Frankfurter’s First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 257.  
72. PETERS, supra note 4, at 65. 
73. Id. at 54–55. 
74. Id. at 55. 
75. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943). 
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slept through Gobitis but woke up in time for Barnette. 
The criticism of Gobitis and the impact of the decision on Witness 
persecutions also help to explain the rapid switch in votes.  The Gobitis–
Barnette story demonstrates that flawed judicial restraint is occasionally 
just as dangerous as flawed judicial intervention.   
Consider the two possibilities.  If forced to generalize, I would 
suggest that, in most close constitutional cases, the Court should err on 
the side of deference to the elected branches—on the side of judicial 
restraint.  More often than not, the Court poses a greater risk to the 
country by invalidating laws than by letting the political processes 
oversee them.  The American people are more likely to accept the 
resolution of difficult social and economic issues when they have a say in 
the matter.  While democracy is flexible, judicial review is not.  While 
democracy is designed to adjust to new circumstances, judicial review 
generally is not.  And while all legislative and judicial decisions will have 
unintended (and unknown) consequences, the elected branches are far 
better equipped to respond to them than are life-tenured judges.  In 
close cases, it thus makes sense for courts to err on the side of 
democracy—to allow the elected branches of government to monitor, 
adjust to, and ultimately solve, as best they can, difficult social and 
economic problems. 
Yet Gobitis illustrates the risk of generalization.  One can fairly 
make the case that Gobitis took a bad situation (needless persecution of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses) and through inaction made it worse (by prompting 
increased violence against Witnesses).  As Covington, the Barnetts’ 
lawyer, argued with only some hyperbole, Gobitis facilitated a “civil war 
against the Jehovah’s Witnesses.”76  Judges, like doctors, should first be 
mindful that they do no harm—that they do not make a bad situation 
worse.  The Court did not heed this lesson in Gobitis, which is surely one 
of the reasons the Court overruled it so quickly.  Every now and then 
there can be harm in inaction, something that Plessy v. Ferguson77 
demonstrated before Gobitis and that Korematsu v. United States78 
reaffirmed after it. 
Fourth, a discerning reader might wonder why Chief Justice Stone 
assigned the Barnette opinion to Justice Jackson.  Stone had written the 
solo dissent in Gobitis.  Jackson was a newcomer to the Court.  And of 
course Stone by then was the Chief Justice, the first among equals on 
 
76. PETERS, supra note 4, at 249.  
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
78. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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the Court—and the first among non-equals when it comes to opinion 
assignments.  I do not know the answer, but I have my suspicions. 
Justice Jackson was the weakest link in the majority.  As time would 
show, Jackson’s inclinations about judicial review were closer to 
Frankfurter’s than to Stone’s.79  No less importantly, the majority faced a 
doctrinal dispute that continues to this day.  Was Barnette (as well as 
cases like it) about religious liberties or about free speech?  To Stone 
and others, Barnette was a case about the free exercise of religion.80  Yet 
to Jackson, Barnette was a case about compelled speech.81  He could not 
understand why anyone should be required to salute the flag, whether 
over faith-based objections or something else.82  If the Barnette principle 
applied to spiritual and secular objections to the pledge, it must be a 
free-speech case.  To this day, the Supreme Court struggles with 
whether to review general laws that restrict speech and faith—such as 
the pledge requirement—under the free-exercise clause or the free-
speech clause.83 
Fifth, the turnaround from Gobitis to Barnette occurred after 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt remade the Court with Democratic 
appointees.  By 1943, only two members of the Court had not been 
appointed by FDR, and both were reasonably congenial to his policies.84  
Chief Justice Stone may not have been appointed to the Court by FDR, 
but FDR elevated him to the Chief Justiceship.85  And Justice Owen 
Roberts had voted several times to uphold New Deal programs, casting 
(as some have characterized it) the fabled switch-in-time vote that 
preserved nine.86 
With this cast of seemingly like-minded Justices, one might have 
 
79. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Roosevelt Court: The Liberals Conquer (1937–
1941) and Divide (1941–1946), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491, 535–36 (1983) tbls.6–8 
(showing the disagreement rates between and among the Justices). 
80. See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., 
dissenting). 
81. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943). 
82. Id. 
83. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: 
Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 431, 476–77 (2006). 
84. See Galloway, supra note 79, at 508–15. 
85. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 203. 
86. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a 
Washington minimum wage law that fixed minimum wages for women and minors); see also 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 84–97 (1998) (casting doubt on the conventional version of 
the “switch in time”). 
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expected a unified Supreme Court.  It did not turn out that way.  They 
remained unified, it is true, in permitting virtually unlimited exercises of 
the commerce power by Congress,87 and in agreeing that the Court 
should not second-guess state and federal economic regulations.88  But 
when it came to civil liberties, unanimity disappeared. 
A little history helps to explain why.  Odd though it may sound to 
modern ears, the first promoters of frequent and aggressive judicial 
review were conservatives.  In the first four decades of the twentieth 
century, a conservative-dominated Supreme Court invoked liberty of 
contract and the limited and enumerated basis of congressional power to 
invalidate hundreds of local, state, and federal laws. 
Progressives responded to these decisions with increasing skepticism 
over the utility and legitimacy of judicial review.  The leading judicial 
progressives of the day—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, 
Louis D. Brandeis, Frankfurter—all decried what they perceived as an 
activist Court.89 
Once FDR had remade the Court with New Dealers, such as Hugo 
L. Black and William O. Douglas, and progressives, such as Frankfurter, 
the question arose as to which way the new Court would go.  Should the 
Justices stand by the Holmesian view of judicial restraint?  Or should 
they treat judicial review differently depending on the type of 
constitutional guarantee at issue? 
With footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.90 in 
1938 and other decisions, then-Justice Stone, who would become the 
author of the lone dissent in Gobitis, proposed a way to retain a 
progressive critique of conservative judicial activism but permit some 
liberal judicial activism—by distinguishing between economic rights on 
the one hand and civil liberties on the other.91  In addition to Stone, 
many of the FDR appointees—not just Black and Douglas, but Frank 
Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge also—embraced this approach. 
Frankfurter was an exception, and so usually was Justice Jackson.  
Noah Feldman put the point in his book Scorpions this way: 
 
87. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that wheat grown by a 
farmer on private land for his own household’s consumption was properly a subject for 
regulation by the Congress under the Commerce Clause). 
88. See Galloway, supra note 79, at 528. 
89. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
519, 526–31, 542 (2012) (summarizing these individuals’ approaches to judicial review).    
90. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
91. See id. at 152–53 n.4. 
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As the other liberals on the Court shifted ground, Frankfurter—
to his astonishment—found himself transformed into a 
conservative.  Frankfurter’s critics, then and later, have tried to 
explain how it could be that the country’s best-known liberal 
became its leading judicial conservative.  But the source of the 
change was not Frankfurter, whose constitutional philosophy 
remained remarkably consistent throughout his career.  It was 
the rest of liberalism that abandoned him and moved on once 
judicial restraint was no longer a useful tool to advance liberal 
objectives.92 
Gobitis is the seed, and Barnette the first fruit, of that division. 
To this day, a struggle lingers over what a progressive or liberal 
jurisprudence should look like.  Judicial conservatives, you might say, 
face a similar dilemma.  Many of today’s conservative Justices came of 
age and defined themselves in opposition to what they perceived as an 
unrestrained Warren Court.  Now that they possess a majority, they 
must decide what their theory of judicial review is and what it should be.  
On top of all this, as Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook reminds us, 
even a Court filled with nine like-minded individuals, indeed nine 
clones, eventually will splinter, whether along lines currently known or 
yet to be imagined.93  The Stone Court is Exhibit A in proving the point, 
as exemplified by the Gobitis–Barnette transformation. 
Sixth, what of the possibility that Frankfurter was right in Gobitis?  
The defense requires advocacy skills I do not possess.  But a few points 
complicate the picture. 
To start, there was a chance that democracy would have solved the 
problem.  The Justice Department, it is true, was not helpful in 
responding to the widespread vigilantism prompted by Gobitis.94  But 
Congress responded.  Between Gobitis and Barnette, Congress passed a 
law establishing that standing silently at attention during the flag salute 
is all that local governments could ask of their citizens.95  The law was 
designed to preempt contrary local laws, and it was a law the Witnesses 
were willing to live with.96  In Barnette, the Court had a chance to rely on 
this law, but it did not. 
In civil-liberties debates, moreover, it sometimes is worth asking this 
 
92. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 232. 
93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at xxiv–xxv (2012). 
94. PETERS, supra note 4, at 98, 113, 141. 
95. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, § 7, 56 Stat. 377, 380. 
96. PETERS, supra note 4, at 246. 
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question: Would you rather live in a country in which a majority of a 
nine-member Supreme Court protects the rights of dissenters or a 
country in which a majority of its citizens do so?  What, for example, is 
more important to the protection of racial and religious minorities in 
this country: Court decisions such as Brown97 or legislation such as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964?98  There is something to Frankfurter’s insight 
that civil liberties are best protected when they become part of our 
political culture and part of what we Americans do for each other, not 
what the Supreme Court does for us.99  Every time the Court protects 
the people from their own mistakes, it risks cheapening self-government 
and undermining the polity’s capacity to steel itself against the next 
misbegotten policy urge of the moment. 
No one can fairly doubt that the laws at issue in Gobitis and Barnette 
went against Frankfurter’s policy preferences.  Before joining the Court, 
he had devoted his career to protecting civil liberties.100  Yet, as he 
appreciated, no judicial philosophy is worth its salt if it does not hurt 
from time to time, if it does not force the judge to rule against preferred 
causes here and there.  Frankfurter may have been wrong in Gobitis, but 
he was right to bury his policy preferences.  We do not have a judiciary 
filled with blue-robed judges and red-robed judges, and Frankfurter was 
surely correct to resist any suggestion to the contrary and indeed to 
devote a professional lifetime to proving the point. 
Consistency is a virtue, not a vice, when it comes to judicial 
philosophy.  Having spent his formative years as a lawyer and a 
professor writing about and criticizing conservative Justices for imposing 
their economic and political views on the country,  Frankfurter was not 
about to sanction the same conduct by a Court suddenly dominated by 
liberals.  He was rightly skeptical of the idea that constitutional rights 
could be neatly divided into economic and liberty rights, and indeed 
there is some support for this point in the modern era.  Is it really true, 
for example, that the Supreme Court’s 2005 Kelo v. City of New 
London101 decision—permitting the use of eminent domain over a 
 
97. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
98. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39–156 (1991) (considering relative 
importance of Brown and the 1964 legislation in accomplishing desegregation); Michael 
J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) 
(same). 
99. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 234 (elaborating on the view). 
100. PETERS, supra note 4, at 56. 
101. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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middle-class family’s home for the purpose of economic development by 
a large corporation—is a case about property rights as opposed to 
liberty rights?  One may fairly disagree with Frankfurter’s application of 
this philosophy in Gobitis, but it is hard to criticize his principled 
consistency on the appropriate role of judicial review in American 
government. 
Frankfurter’s career calls to mind the story, likely apocryphal, of the 
young lawyer who worked for an elected state court official.  The lawyer 
asked his boss how he handled matters that involved patrons who had 
helped support him along the way, whether with financial contributions, 
promotions, introductions, or other forms of support.  The answer was 
straightforward: “I must follow the law where it takes me, whether it 
takes me in the direction of my political friends or not.”  It came with 
one caveat: “Of course, if it is a 50-50 call, I will side with my friends.”  
That sounded reasonable enough, the young lawyer thought at the time.  
But after looking back on several years of service with the elected 
official, the young lawyer noticed a lot of 50-50 calls. 
Say what you will about Justice Frankfurter, whether about his 
Gobitis and Barnette opinions or about his tenure on the Court, but he 
did not rationalize himself into making a lot of 50-50 calls.  No political 
party or interest group kept a halter on Frankfurter once he joined the 
Court. 
Seventh, Frankfurter nonetheless erred in Gobitis and should have 
admitted as much in Barnette.  Not even James Bradley Thayer and 
Holmes, the two people most responsible for influencing Frankfurter’s 
thinking, thought that judicial review had no role to play.102  They 
thought instead that the same restrained theory of judicial review 
applies to all provisions of the Constitution—all rights, all structure.103  
And Frankfurter never took the position that there was no role for 
judicial enforcement of civil liberties.  He embraced the Holmes and 
Brandeis dissent in Abrams v. United States,104 a 1919 case in which the 
Court upheld criminal convictions for distributing antiwar literature.  He 
applauded the Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,105 
which struck down a ban on private schooling.  And he later joined—
and wrote—many such decisions as a Justice. 
 
102. Posner, supra note 89, at 523, 526–27. 
103. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893). 
104. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
105. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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Judges are not known for admitting their mistakes, and perhaps that 
is a tradition that should change.  In any given year, I sit on roughly ten 
to twenty cases that reverse decisions of district court judges.  Is it not 
possible that appellate judges and justices have similar rates of error?  It 
of course helps that they sit in groups of three or nine, which diminishes 
the risk of error.  But that reality does not eliminate the risk. 
As one Justice of the United States Supreme Court aptly put the 
point: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it 
merely because it comes late.”106  The appellate courts might be well 
served to follow that advice.  The source of this advice was Frankfurter 
himself. 
But even if Frankfurter did not learn the right lesson from Gobitis by 
the time of Barnette, it is unfair to say that he remained rigidly opposed 
to judicial review thereafter.  He of course played a significant role in 
the unanimous decision of Brown v. Board of Education.107  So while 
wisdom may indeed have come late for Frankfurter, it did come.  One 
wonders what would have become of Frankfurter’s legacy if it had come 
earlier—if he had been the first member of the Court to realize the 
misstep in Gobitis, if he had written the Barnette majority, if he had used 
the opinion to explain how and why judicial restraint need not mean 
judicial abdication, and if he had begun that opinion by talking about the 
law’s and wisdom’s delays. 
Let me close by mentioning a modest connection between Barnette 
and Marquette Law School.  Almost thirty years after Barnette, an 
important religious-liberties case arose in Wisconsin: Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.108  Amish families in Green County, about 100 miles southwest of 
Milwaukee, challenged a Wisconsin law requiring all children to attend 
school through the age of sixteen.  The Amish faith required children to 
stop attending school after the eighth grade.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the state law violated the free-exercise rights of the families 
and struck it down.109  The decision under review came from the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  It is quite good.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s opinion begins: “No liberty guaranteed by our constitution is 
more important or vital to our free society than is a religious liberty 
 
106. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
107. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
108. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
109. Id. at 234–35. 
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protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment.”110  It then 
invokes Barnette, noting that, just as an exemption for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses had no great impact on other citizens or on the policy 
underlying the flag-salute law, so the same would be true with an 
exemption for Amish children and parents from the compulsory-
education law.111  The author of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, 
quite fittingly, was one of Marquette’s own professors: Chief Justice 
E. Harold Hallows, whom we remember with this lecture. 
 
110. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 434, 182 N.W.2d 539, 540 (1971). 
111. Id. at 442, 182 N.W.2d at 544. 
